Abstract-We consider the problem of communication over a network containing a hidden and malicious adversary that can control a subset of network resources, and aims to disrupt communications. We focus on omniscient node-based adversary, i.e., the adversary can control a subset of nodes, and knows the message, network code and packets on all links. Characteriz ing information-theoretically optimal communication rates as a function of network parameters and bounds on the adversarially controlled network is in general open, even for unicast (single source, single destination) problems. In this work we characterize the information-theoretically optimal randomized capacity of such problems, i.e., under the assumption that the source node shares (an asymptotically negligible amount of) independent common randomness with each network node a priori. We propose a novel computationally-efficient communication scheme whose rate matches a natural information-theoretically "erasure outer bound" on the optimal rate. Our schemes require no prior knowledge of network topology, and can be implemented in a distributed manner as an overlay on top of classical distributed linear network coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding allows routers in networks to mix pack ets. This helps attain information-theoretically throughput for a variety of network communication problems; in particu lar for network multicast [1], [2] , often via linear coding operations [3] , [4] . Throughput-optimal network codes can be efficiently designed [5] , and may even be implemented distributedly [6] . Also, network-coded communication is more robust to packet losses/link-failures [2] , [4] .
However, when the network contains malicious nodes/links, due to the mixing nature of network coding, even a single erroneous packet can cause all packets at the receivers being corrupted. This motivates the problem of network error cor rection, which was first studied by Cai and Yeung in [7] , [8] . They considered an omniscient adversary capable of injecting errors on any z links, and showed that C -2z is both an inner and outer bound on the optimal throughput, where C is the network-multicast min-cut. Jaggi et al. [9] , Kotter and Kschischang [10] proposed, in parallel, efficient network codes to achieve this rate. Furthermore, when the adversary is of "limited-view" in some manner, a higher rate is possible, and P. Tian, S. Jaggi, and M. Bakshi are with the Chinese University of Hong Kong (e-mail: tianpeida.cuhk@gmail.com.jaggi@ie.cuhk.edu.hk. mayank@inc.cuhk.edu.hk). The work of P. Tian, S. Jaggi, and M. Bakshi described in this paper was partially supported by a grant from University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project No. AoE/E-02/08).
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Although communication in the presence of "link-based" adversaries is now relatively well-understood, problems where the adversaries are "node-based" seem to be much more challenging. In node-based case, the adversaries can attack any subset of at most z nodes by injecting errors on outgoing edges of those nodes. Since the adversary is restricted to control nodes, this places restrictions on the subsets of links it can control. This problem was first studied by Kosut et al. in [14] , [15] , where it is shown that reducing node-based adversary to link-based one is too coarse, and linear codes are insufficient in general. A class of non-linear network codes was proposed [15] to achieve capacity for a subset of planer networks, but the general problem of characterizing network capacity with node-based adversaries is still open.
This problem has been studied from various perspectives. A cut-set bound was given in [14] , [15] . The routing-only capacity was studied in [16] . The work of [17] explored the unequal link capacities, and [18] considered a general problem formulation subsuming both link-based and node based adversaries. The fundamental complexity was examined in [19] , where the authors showed the general network error correction is as hard as a long standing open problem, i. e. multiple unicast network coding.
On the other hand, in coding theory, hard problems can be considerably simplified if terminal nodes share a small amount of common randomness. For instance, the capacity of adversarial bit-flip channel is still unknown in general, but it can be characterized if shared randomness is available [20] .
Motivated by the power of shared secrets, this paper con siders node-based adversary problems with a small amount of shared secrets. Under such settings, we provide a family of net work codes that are computationally efficient and information theoretically optimal. The shared secrets between source and each other node can either be pre-allocated or distributed by applying network secrets sharing schemes [21] . In addition, our network codes can be distributedly implemented and work well even when the network topology is unknown, as one can see in Section V.
II. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
Consider the network in Figure 1 . The goal is to find the maximum communication rate in the presence of an adversary. Before studying the capacity of this network in our setting, we examine the capacity when there is no shared secret between nodes, both for the link-based adversary model and the node based adversary model.
Link-based adversary: Calvin can choose any two links to attack. The maximum achievable rate of this model is shown to be C -2z by [9] . Therefore, the capacity is 0 in this case.
Node-based adversary: Calvin can choose any one node and attack on the outgoing links of his chosen node. Since the out degree of any intermediate node is at most 2, it is tempting to reduce such an adversary to previous link-based one, and we get zero rate. However, it turns out that the capacity is 1, achievable by "majority decoding" based code. Alice sends message x on all outgoing links. Intermediate nodes perform majority decoding and forward the decoded packet. By a careful case-by-case analysis ! , node t can always decode x correctly. The converse follows from the Singleton bound [22] (see also [15, Theorem 1]). Our model: In our model, in addition to treating the adversary as node-based (that can control any one node), we also allow the source Alice to share independent common randomness (or shared secrets) with every other node in the network. As we will see later, this is a crucial assumption that distinguishes our model from prior models.
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At a very superficial level, the role of the shared secrets is to let a node just downstream from the adversary detect any cor rupted packets by verifying (using the shared secrets) whether or not the received packets belong to the subspace spanned by original packets. We show that even with an asymptotically negligible rate of shared secret, rate 2 is achievable in this example. Further, this is the best one can hope for as the adversary can always send zeros on one link in a min cut.
The code consists of a source encoder, intermediate node encoders and a destination decoder.
Source encoder: Let r = 2. There are two steps. First, as in random linear network coding [6] , each message !vI E lF�r is encoded as a matrix X E lF �x ( n+r ) consisting of the information part U E lF�xn and coefficient header part I E lF�xr (identity matrix). The second step is crucial, which is computation of the hash header h. The two resulting vectors ( Xl, h ) and ( X2, h ) are referred as original packets. Then random linear combinations ( aIXI + a2X2, h ) are sent on outgoing links, where aI, a2 E IF q.
In this example, h consists of four parts ha, hb, h e, ht, each 2 being a vector from lF� and corresponding to nodes a, b, c, t,
1 If node a is controlled, after majority decoding, nodes b, c forward x to node t. If node c is controlled, then nodes a, b forward x to node t.
respectively. The length of h therefore is 6 = 16, which is independent of n. In the following, we formally describe the computation of h e ; all other hashes, i. e., ha, hb, ht are also computed in a similar way. 
Decoder: Let ( YI, hI ) ' ( Y2, h2 ) and ( Y3, h3 ) be the packets received on links ( a, t), (b, t) and (c, t). Bob first verifies Y;'s by previously described verification process. Since at most one node is controlled, at least two of YI, Y2, Y3 are valid, say YI, Y2. 
B. Network Model
Network: We model the network with a directed graph Q = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes (routers) and [ is the set of links between nodes. We assume that all links have unit capacity, meaning that they can carry one symbol from F per time step. We also allow multiple edges connecting the same pair of nodes. The source node Vo (Alice) wishes to multicast the message !vI, which is a vector chosen uniformly at random form Fnr, to a set of destination nodes V: = {tl, ... ,tK}.
The network model is illustrated in Fig. 2 We consider a node-based adversary (Calvin). That is, Calvin can control any z nodes from V\{Vo,tl, ... ,tK} and transmit any information in the out going edges of these z nodes. In other words, let A be the collection of all sets of outgoing edges of any z nodes in V\{Vo,tl, ... ,tK}; the adversary can choose any one set A E A and inject arbitrary information on links in A.
The adversary is omniscient. That is, Calvin knows the message, the code, and all packets transmitted in the network. For the z nodes that Calvin selects to control, he also knows their shared secrets with source node. Calvin does not know shared secrets between the source and honest nodes (nodes that Calvin cannot control). Code: A code consists of the following:
• Link encoders: For each node V and each link e E [out(v), a function that gives the symbol to send on e, given all information available to node v: shared secrets for node v, all packets from edges in [i n ( v), and, if v is Alice, the message, and shared secrets for all nodes.
• Decoder: For each destination node tk and each message lvli for 'i E [ qnr ] , a function for estimating !vIi based on information available at node tk: shared secrets and received packets.
Code metrics: We evaluate codes based on the following quantities:
• Field size q,
• Shared secret dimension s,
• Number of message symbols qnr, • Probability of error: for any A E A, let Pe(A) be the probability that IVlt" i # M i for any tk E V and any 'i E [ qnr ] , maximized over all possible data injections on edges in A,
• Total blocklength (bits), denoted by N,
• Rate R = (nr log q)/N.
• Complexity T, including encoding/decoding complexity.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
We begin by stating our main results, computationally efficient achievability. For comparison, we also state two converse results that follow fairly direct from results already in the literature. The first states that the rate can be no larger than if the adversarial edges were simply deleted, and this "erasure outer bound" follows from [1] when the residual graph is considered. This confirms that the rate achieved in Theorem 1 is essentially as large as possible. The second result states that shared secrecy is necessary to achieve vanishing probability of error for all adversary sets. Proof outlines are in the appendices and details are in [23] . 
V. CODING WITH SHARED SECRETS
To simplify the description, in this section, we state our scheme for the case K = 1 and z = 1, that is, single source single destination and A being the collection of sets of outgoing edges of any one node in V\ { vo, t}. We refer the reader to the longer version [23] on this paper for a detailed description covering the general case. In the following, let r : = minAEA min-cut( va, t; QA).
where ai E F for any 1 .-::: 'i .-::: n and integer n.
Definition 2 (SLP hash function). Let k be a positive integer.
For a vector x E F k and 81, 82 E F, define the SLP hash function'ljJ : F k XF 2 ---+ F byljJ(x, 81, 82) := 82-L:� =1 X18r/.
Source encoder: Algorithm 1 describes the encoding pro cess, which consists of two steps. Firstly, each message lvI E [q nr ] is encoded into a matrix X as described in Section II. Denote Xi the i-th row of X and XiI the (i, l) th entry of X. Secondly, the hash header h E F O is computed and appended to all Xi'S. Notice here that 6 (specified later) is negligible as N tends to infinity. Figure 3 shows the structure of the i-th packet. Fig. 3 . The i-th packet (Xi, h) and size of each part. The total length of (Xi, h) is n + r + J many finite field elements, or equivalently (n + r + J) log2 q bits, where J is independent of n.
The header h consists of I V I -1 parts, with each part being for all v E V\{vo, t} do
4:
Compute [sv l;
5:
Obtain h by rewriting all hv' s in a row vector;
7:
for all e = (vo,v) E Eout(vo) do
8:
Send random linear combinations 0=;'= 1 ae , iXi, h) on e. 
In Section II, we have described the verification procedure in details for the specific packet W(e) = Xl + 2X2. This scheme works w.h.p. over the randomness in the shared secrets. The following lemma states this formally. for all e E Ei n(U) do
3:
Compute Q1, Q2;
4:
if Q1 = Q2, then label W (e) as valid;
5:
else, label W (e) as invalid. 6: procedure ENcoDER(all valid W(e), e E Ei n(U))
7:
for all e E EOUl(U) do
8:
Send random linear combinations (2:= ae, W (e'), h) on e, where W(e')'s are valid packets.
Decoder: Destination node Bob verifies received packets, and decodes using all valid ones (see Algorithm 3). for all e E Ei n(t) do
3:
4:
5:
else, label W (e) as invalid.
6:
Rearrange all valid packets as Y.
7:
procedure DEcoDER(all valid W(e), e E Ei n(t))
8:
Solve Y = T X with unknowns being X ;
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We develop novel computationally-efficient network codes using shared secrets for node-based adversary problems. Our codes meet a natural erasure outer bound. Although the description here is specialized for the case of single node adversary and single receiver, our techniques also extend to more general cases, including multicast, multiple nodes adversary, general adversarial sets, networks with unequal link capacities and cyclic networks, see our longer version [23] for details.
(w�, ... , W�, Wn+I, ... , Wn+r) = L:� =l Wn + iXi be the correct linear combination claimed by header of W (e). We bound the probability of the event EI := {QI = Q2} conditioned on E2 := {W ( e ) cJ W'(e)}. � '=l lii' X ( h� ,i,i' -hu ,i,i') = 0, where the left hand side is a non-zero polynomial of degree at most p n in Su,l, ... , su,r. Since the shared secrets Su,l, ... , su ,r are uniformly generated from IFpm, by the Schwartz Zippel Lemma (see [24] ), we have P(EIIE2) -s: �, which is exponentially small in n when Tn = 8 ( n), say Tn = 2n. The case of W(e) = W'(e) follows from direct computation, which we omit here. Let r = minAEAmintkEDmin-cut(va,tk;QA ) and given any E > 0, take n such that d inp n -m < E and n ;:+ o > r -E, where 5 := (IVI -1)r 2 . Then design network code described in Section V over IF p2n which satisfies all requirements in Theorem 1 (see details in [23] ). The proof is based on a symmetrization argument (e.g. [15, Theorem 1]). See [23] for details. 
